amendment to section 3060 of title 18 of the United States Code. The amendment specifies that unless the preliminary hearing is waived by the defendant or postponed with his consent it "shall be held within a reasonable time following initial appearance" of the accused before the magistrate, but no later than the tenth day after the initial appearance if the defendant is in custody or the twentieth day if the defendant has been released. 6 Prior to this amendment, section 3060 was merely a cross-reference to rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 7 Rule 5 provides 8 6. Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 303(a), 82 Stat. 1117 Stat. (1968 : Section 3060, title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: " § 3060. Preliminary examination "(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, a preliminary examination shall be held within the time set by the judge or magistrate pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the arrested person has committed it.
"(b) The date for the preliminary examination shall be fixed by the judge or magistrate at the initial appearance of the arrested person. Except as provided by subsection (c) of this section, or unless the arrested person waives the preliminary examination, such examination shall be held within a reasonable time following initial appearance, but in any event not later than-"(l) the tenth day following the date of the initial appearance of the arrested person before such officer if the arrested person is held in custody without any provision for release, or is held in custody for failure to meet the conditions of release imposed, or is released from custody only during specified hours of the day;.(~r the twentieth day following the date of the initial appearance if the arrested person is released from custody under any condition other than a condition described in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
"(c) With the consent of the arrested person, the date fixed by the judge or magistrate for the preliminary examination may be a date later than that prescribed by subsection (b), or may be continued one or more times to a date subse• quent to the date initially fixed therefor. In the absence of such consent of the accused, the date fixed for the preliminary hearing may be a date later than that prescribed by subsection (b), or may be continued to a date subsequent to the date mitially fixed therefor, only upon the order of a judge of the appropriate United States district court after a finding that extraordinary circumstances exist, and that the delay of the preliminary hearing is indispensable to the interests of justice.
"(d) Except as provided by subsection (e) of this section, an arrested person who has not been accorded the preliminary examination required by subsection (a) within the period of time fixed by the judge or magistrate in compliance with subsections (b) and (c), shall be discharged from custody or from the requirement of bail or any other condition of release, without prejudice, however, to the institution of further criminal proceedings against him upon the charge upon which he was arrested.
"(e) No preliminary examination in compliance with subsection (a) of this section shall be required to be accorded an arrested person, nor shall such arrested person be discharged from custody or from the requirement of bail or any other condition of release pursuant to subsection (d), if at any time subsequent to the initial appearance of such person before a judge or magistrate and prior to the date fixed for the preliminary examination pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) an indictment is returned or, in appropriate cases, an information is filed against such person in a court of the United States.
"(f) Proceedings before United States magistrates under this section shall be taken down by a court reporter or recorded by suitable sound recording equip• ment. A copy of the record of such proceeding shall be made available at the expense of the United States to a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay or give security therefor, and the expense of such copy shall be paid by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts." 7. In its entirety, section 3060 had read: " § 3060. Preliminary Examination-that a defendant arrested prior to indictment should be brought before a committing magistrate, there informed of his rights, and "within a reasonable time" afforded a preliminary hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to detain him pending grand jury consideration 9 of his case. If section 303 had simply prescribed the ten-and twenty-day limits for nonconsensual continuances of the hearing date, it would have added needed specificity to the "reasonable time" requirement of rule 5(c). But section 303 goes on to provide that " [n] o preliminary examination : . . shall be required to be accorded an arrested person ... if at any time subsequent to the initial appearance of such person . . . and prior to the date fixed for the preliminary examination ... an indictment is returned .... " 10 Instead of "improv [ing] the law relating to preliminary hearings of accused persons," this provision offers the well-organized prosecutor's office an invitation to avoid a preliminary hearing altogether. Senator (Rule) SEE FEDERAL Rur.Es OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Proceedings before commissioner, appearance, advice as to right to counsel, bearing, Rule 5." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645 , § 1, 62 Stat. 819.
Rule 5 reads:
(a) .APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COIIIMISSIONER. An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.
(b) STATEMENT BY THE CoM?.nssroNER. The commissioner shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him and of any affidavit filed therewith, of his right to retain counsel, of his right to request the assignment of counsel if he is unable to obtain counsel, and of his right to have a preliminary examination. He shall also inform the defendant that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement made by him may be used against him. The commissioner shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules.
(c) PRELIMINARY ExAMINATION. The defendant shall not be called upon to plead. If the defendant waives preliminary examination, the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district court. If the defendant does not waive examination, the commissioner shall hear the evidence within a reasonable time. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf. If from the evidence it appears to the commissioner that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district court; otherwise the commissioner shall discharge him. The commissioner shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules. After concluding the proceeding the commissioner shall transmit forthwith to the clerk of the district court all papers in the proceeding and any bail taken by him. For a discussion of the effect of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 on rule 5, see pt. III. C. infra.
9.
If the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor, or if he waives grand jury indictment, grand jury consideration is not required and the prosecutor may instead file an information. Fm. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
IO. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3060(e) (Supp. Feb. 1969 ). This section is quoted in note 6 supra.
[ Vol. 67:1861 Tydings, the sponsor and architect of the Act, recognized this possibility, and predicted that " [t] he ultimate result in our busy urban districts may be the virtual elimination of preliminary hearings, but only if the present grand jury delays are eliminated first." 11 Under prior law, it is true, many federal prosecutors routinely avoided preliminary hearings by securing continuances of the hearing date until after an indictment was obtained. 12 But this ploy required a complaisant magistrate or an inert defendant. Moreover, the propriety of using continuances to circumvent the accused's right to a preliminary hearing had come under increasing and sometimes successful attack. 13 Section 303, if literally construed, can legitimize the prosecutorial practice of mooting the defendant's right to a preliminary hearing under rule 5(c) by obtaining a relatively quick indictment. 14 This predictable use or abuse of the Act should and can be prevented, we submit, either by a judicial construction of section 303 that preserves the defendant's right to a prompt preliminary hearing, 15 or by provision for alternative forms of discovery16 that would reduce the prosecutor's motivation for avoiding the hearing.
11. Remarks on the floor of the Senate, Feb. 8, 1967, reprinted J,475] . Compare the opinions on this point in two staff memoranda prepared to accompany draft legislation. Staff Memorandum, April 28, 1966, in Hearings on S. J,475, at 9, 15: "[I] t is anticipated that preliminary hearings will rarely be held." Staff Memorandum, June 7, 1966, Hearings on S. J,475, at 29, 86: It is anticipated that this procedure will, at least initially, increase the frequency of preliminary hearings in districts in which the gran,l jury backlog is such that no action can be expected within a short time after arrest and presentment. It will also provide something of an incentive for prompt grand jury action, in that a prosecutor who wishes to avoid a preliminary hearing can do so only by getting his case to the grand jury quickly. 12. See S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967) Sess., r,t. 3, at 220-22, 254-55 (1966) 
II. FUNCTIONS OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING UNDER PRIOR LAW
A. Historical Perspective
I. Early English and American Uses
Contemporary debate on the preliminary hearing has largely focused upon whether the hearing's sole purpose is to determine the existence of probable cause to hold the accused, or whether the hearing has the additional purpose of affording the defendant an opportunity for discovery. 17 Today either function is assumed to be primarily for the defendant's benefit. The weight of judicial authority recognizes only the former purpose; as the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in 1967, "[i]t is quite clear from the logic as well as the history of the procedure that discovery is not one of its purposes." 18 The draftmen of the Federal Magistrates Act clearly shared this assumption: "Your committee believes that a judicial determination of the question of probable cause for the accused's restraint is the historic purpose of a preliminary examination, and that in light of certain current practices it is necessary to spell out that purpose .... " 19 But in its origin, in sixteenth century English law, the preliminary hearing was designed primarily to serve the purpose of discovery-and to do so for the benefit of the prosecution. The first preliminary hearing statute, 20 which was enacted in 1554, provided that nvo justices of the peace were to examine prisoners before they were admitted to bail, to hear the testimony of those who charged them, and to record the information thus disclosed. This significant development in criminal procedure came about "apparently by accident, for the motive of the enactment was, it seems, to prevent collusion between justices and criminals" in releasing defendants on bail. 21 A statute enacted in the following year ex-17. See text accompanying notes 47-68 infra. 18. Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1967 ), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968 . The court noted that " [t] here is extensive authority in the cases for the proposition that the return of an indictment, which establishes probable cause, eliminates the need for a preliminary examination." 385 F .2d at 133. It declined to order a post-indictment preliminary hearing. [Vol. 67:1361 tended the examination procedure to cases in which the prisoner was not bailed but committed, 22 and soon "it became apparent that an important novelty had been introduced, albeit obliquely, into criminal procedure." 23 Under the statute, "all arrested persons were to be brought before the magistrate and to be examined by him. He would then try to discover what evidence he could against the accused and see to it that that evidence was not lost." 24 The preliminary examination thus came to serve a vital discovery function for the prosecution at a time when there was neither a police force nor a public prosecutor.25 The magistrate's investigatory duties later began to decline, about the same time as the first professional police force was established. 26 The requirement that the accused be examined at preliminary hearing was finally abolished in England in 1848. Philip and Mary] was the reflection of the fact that at that time (and indeed for close to another three hundred years) there was no organized governmental agency faced with the task of prosecuting criminals. There was no prosecuting attorney in England at that time, and, from the standpoint of the preliminary examination even more significant, there was no police force. There was literally no participation on the part of government in the criminal proceedings at this stage. This necessarily operated very largely to the benefit of undeserving persons, because it might be possible to do away with incriminating evidence, or the gathering of evidence might not begin until it was too late. See also Devlin, The Police in a Changing Society, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P. S. 123, 125 (1966) .
26. In England, this was in 1829. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 21, at 432. According to Holdsworth, as late as 1823 it was stated to the grand jury that, when a magistrate was conducting this preliminary examination, he was acting inquisitorially and not judicially; that such proceedings might and ought to be conducted in secret; and that information so ascertained might be communicated to the prosecutor but not to the party accused.
I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH I.Aw 296 (7th ed. 1956).
27. Sir John Jervis ' Act, 11 & 12 Viet., c. 42 (1848) . Shortly thereafter by the Act of 30 & 31 Viet., c. 35 (1867) , the defendant was allowed to call witnesses at the prelimi-to the important role that discovery played in the early preliminary examinations, the screening function was more limited than at present. The rule as stated by Hale was: "If a person be brought before a Justice, if it appears no Felony be committed, he may discharge him; but if a Felony be committed, though it appears not that the party accused is guilty, yet he cannot discharge him, but must commit or bail him." 28 The basic English preliminary examination statutes were in effect in this country both before and after the Revolution; 29 as in England, the examination served the purpose of discovery for the prosecution. 80 But some states rejected or limited the English preliminary examination statutes because of their incompatibility with constitutional provisions securing the privilege against selfincrimination. 31 As Justice Rutledge has pointed out: nary hearing. For a discussion of the legislation, see 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 21, at 220-29. It seems likely that there was a shift in emphasis of the preliminary hearing away from requiring the accused to make a statement even before the adoption of the [ Vol. 67:1361 Historically it was the preliminary inquisition which gave rise to the privilege. It was won through centuries of struggle against abuses of magisterial as well as more formal judicial inquisition. The modern hearing is the lineal descendant of the ancient preliminary examination. But its character has changed with the evolution of the privilege and other constitutional guaranties.a2
The shift away from requiring the accused to testify at preliminary hearing was accompanied by increasing opportunities for the defense to gain positive advantages at the hearing. Gradually the accused obtained the right to be present at the hearing and to be accompanied by counsel, 33 to cross-examine witnesses against him, 34
In [and) the trial of a criminal in this state must be governed by the rules of the common law, and our own act of Assembly; neither of which will justify his own examination in order to convict him." The magistrate was authorized "to take the voluntary information of the accused." Id. at 205 (emphasis added). The privilege against self-incrimination was contained in the first Alabama Constitution, art. 1, § 10 (1819 it was professed to confront the accused and the witnesses, and allow the benefits of crossexamination, in practice the right of counsel for the accused to be present as a matter of right was denied.').
There may have been mixed motives for allowing the defendant to be present. See J. GOEBEL 8i: T. NAUGHTON, supra note 30, at 33-34: the right to confrontation at the preliminary examination "probably developed during the early eighteenth century, chiefly because it was a convenient way to wrest a confession from a prisoner,"
34. H. If, upon the examination of the whole matter, it appears to the magistrate either that no offence has been committed by any person, or that there is no probable cause for charging the prisoner therewith, he must discharge him. It appears formerly to have been held, and upon high authority, that if there were an express charge of felony, on oath, against the prisoner, the magistrate had no discretion to discharge, but must bail or commit him. But this position has been controverted by all recent authorities, and cannot be considered as the law at the present day. For it has been well observed, that according to this doctrine, the liberty and character of every man in the country would be placed at the mercy, not of the magistrate, (for he is assumed to have no discretion,) but at the mercy of any corrupt and infamous individual, who might think proper to make a positive oath that a felony had been committed by the person whom he accused-a doctrine too monstrous to be stated as law. (The 1846 edition of this work, supra note 33, at 280, is in accord with the first paragraph of the above quotation but lacks the commentary contained in the second paragraph.) Accord, T. WATERMAN, supra note 33, at 207; cf. D. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 112; H. POTIER, THE OFFICE AND Durr OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 60 (1816) ("The justice should discharge persons brought before him charged with any crime, if upon inquiry it manifestly appears either that no crime was committed, or that the suspicion entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless: otherwise he must be committed to prison or give bail,"). See also J. LATROBE, supra note 29, at 317:
If there be an express charge of felony, on oath, against the prisoner, though his guilt appear doubtful, the justice cannot wholly discharge him, but must bail or commit him • • • • And, in modem practices, though exculpatory evidence is re• ceived at the instance of the prisoner, and certified with the other depositions, unless it appear in the clearest manner that the charge is malicious, as well as groundless, it is not usual for the magistrate to discharge him, even when he believes him to be altogether innocent.
[Vol. 67:1361 clear himself from suspicion. " 38 The same source also recognized the possibility of using testimony taken at the preliminary hearing for impeachment at trial 39 -a principal object of contemporary defense counsel who use the preliminary hearing for discovery. 40
Rule 5(c) Prior to the Magistrates Act
From 1789 until the adoption of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946, the preliminary hearing in federal practice followed, in large measure, the practice of the state in which the federal court was sitting. 41 The federal provision adopted as rule 5(c), which was thought to reflect prevailing state practice, 42 reads: 38. D. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 92. The same language, though different grammar, is to be found in J. BENEDICT, supra note 33, at 469, where it is added: "And it being for the benefit of the accused, he has a right to insist upon an examination taking place, before he can be compelled to enter into a recognizance. FEDERAL RULES 228-30 (1966) . Orfield concludes that "the great bulk of the cases held that state law was applicable to almost every aspect of the preliminary examination in the federal
The defendant shall not be called upon to plead. If the defendant waives preliminary examination, the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district court. If the defendant does not waive examination, the commissioner shall hear the evidence within a reasonable time. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf. If from the evidence it appears to the commissioner that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district court; otherwise the commissioner shall discharge him .... the law by specifying the purpose of the preliminary hearing: the legislative history of amended section 3060 makes clear that the only purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine probable cause, and that discovery is no longer, if it ever was, a purpose of the hearing. 46 
B. Theoretical Screening and Discovery Functions of the Preliminary Hearing
In contemporary judicial thinking, it is generally accepted that the task of screening out weak or unsupported charges and discharging the defendant if the committing magistrate finds no probable cause to believe that he is guilty is a proper function of the preliminary hearing. 47 34-36 (1967) , Two commissioners raised the issue with the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery in response to a question as to whether the preliminary hearing is well designed to achieve its goals:
"Preliminary hearings, left to Commissioners, are very summary. The worth depends on individuals. This is the reason more thought should be given to appointment."
"If the office of Commissioner is competently discharged, I think it adequately serves its purpose. However, I personally know of U.S. Commissioners who were appointed because of their personal connections with a Federal Judg.,, and who have no other qualifications." Questionnaire 490-91.
49. Questionnaire 491, stated that "[s]ome commissioners were critical of the Rule 5(c), like its state counterparts, makes no express reference to affording the defendant discovery. But some degree of discovery is an inevitable result of an adversary hearing in which probable cause is established through the testimony of witnesses. The desire of prosecutors to avoid the discovery function of the preliminary hearing, rather than their desire to avoid the screening function, has given rise to the widespread practice of continuing the preliminary hearing date until the return of an indictment renders a hearing moot. 50 By the same token, it is defense counsels' desire to use the hearing as a means of obtaining discovery-a means not available under any other rule 51 -that has led them to challenge this practice and other restrictions on the opportunity to use preliminary hearings as a discovery device. 52 These challenges have yielded a body of recent case law on the subject of whether discovery is a legitimate function of a rule 5(c) preliminary hearing.
Against the backdrop of these cases, and particularly the decisions in the District of Columbia, the draftsmen of the Federal
Magistrates Act fashioned section 303. 53 In so doing they chose to fact that the government may seek an indictment from the grand jury regardless of whether the case had been heard by the commissioner, and regardless of his decision on probable cause if it was heard •••• " The staff report quotes from two commis• sioners who mentioned cases in which they had found no probable cause after which indict· ments had been obtained but without successful prosecution. "One year I dismissed six cases after which the Grand Jury indicted and, on trial in U.S. Court, all thereof were acquitted." " ••• I have discharged defendants, and the U.S. Attorney subsequently indicts them; in several cases, the Judge turned them loose again." Id.
50. The possibility of saving time for prosecutors, law enforcement officials, and other witnesses by avoiding the preliminary hearing is an additional justification for the practice.
In general, United States Attorneys have had free rein to avoid the preliminary hearing. Answers by two United States Commissioners to a Subcommittee question as to why preliminary hearings were not held were particularly disturbing: "When ap• pointed I was instructed by U.S. District Attorney to set hearings far enough in advance to allow for grand jury indictment." "It is the policy of the U.S. Attorney not to have preliminary hearings." Questionnaire 483 (emphasis added); cf. note 12 supra.
None of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides for the cross• examination under oath of potential government witnesses before trial in order to obtain discovery of their testimony. Under rule 15(a), the court may, after indictment, allow the defendant to take the deposition of "a prospective witness [who] may be unable to attend or prevented from attending a trial or hearing" if his testimony is material and a deposition is necessary "to prevent a failure of justice." But this pro• vision was not intended as a discovery device and has not been used as such. follow the weight of authority and reject the discovery function of the preliminary hearing. 54 Before criticizing this choice, it will be helpful to review the judicial precedent on the subject. Like the Committee, we will take special note of the case law that has developed in the District of Columbia, since it has differed markedly from practice in other parts of the federal judicial system.
C. Case Law on the Functions of the Preliminary Hearing
Although all of the participants in a preliminary hearing are well aware that discovery is a significant outcome of the proceedings, most courts have refused to recognize discovery as a valid purpose of the hearing. Instead, the courts have generally declared that screening cases for grand jury action is the sole valid purpose; the reported decisions indicate that only rarely have courts thwarted the prosecutor's inclination to moot the hearing by seeking a continuance pending indictment. But the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit took a major step in curbing this practice in 1961 55 when an appellant alleged that postponement of his hearing pending indictment was "representative of a general philosophy or pattern." 56 The court emphatically declared that "persons accused of crime are entitled to prompt preliminary hearings pursuant to Rule 5. The subcommittee's previous hearings on the commissioner system have disclosed that a great deal of confusion exists about the procedures and purpose of the preliminary hearing. Indeed, any study of the common law background of the preliminary hearing, and of the cases which have been handed down since this Nation's formation will indicate that there is a great deal of cloudiness and confusion about the range and purpose of preliminary hearings. The bill accepts the traditional notion that the hearing is solely a device for the determination of probable cause • • • • The preliminary hearing provision of the bill operates on the assumption that the problem of pretrial discovery should be treated separately and apart from the preliminary hearing. 55. Drew v. Beard, 290 F.2d 741. 56. 290 F.2d at 741. 57. 290 F.2d at 742. The committing magistrate had postponed the hearing on the ground that the defendant was on bond, a ground disapproved by the court of appeals: "The fact that an accused is at liberty on bond does not in itself constitute a reason for denying him a prompt preliminary hearing, or postponing the hearing to a future date." 290 F.2d at 742. The language is dictum; the appeal was dismissed as moot because the preliminary hearing had been scheduled for the same day as the appeal was decided. However, the dictum had an important practical impact in reducing the practice of bypassing preliminary hearings in the District of Columbia. See also Wilson Three years later, in Blue v. United States} 8 the same court analyzed the purposes of the hearing and found discovery to be one of them:
It has generally been thought that the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to afford the accused (1) an opportunity to establish that there is no probable cause for his continued detention and thereby to regain his liberty and, possibly, escape prosecution, and (2) a chance to learn in advance of trial the foundations of the charge and the evidence that will comprise the government's case against him.119
Recognition of discovery as an independently valid purpose of the preliminary hearing proved to be a remarkably controversial statement-and one from which the court has recently retreated. After several decisions following Blue's recognition of the discovery function of the preliminary hearing, 00 in Ross v. Sirica 61 the court had to decide whether to review en bane a panel decision ordering the reopening of a preliminary hearing so that additional witnesses might be subpoenaed. The petition for en bane rehearing was denied over the vigorous dissent of three judges, who felt that the panel decision necessarily depended upon an erroneous belief that discovery was a valid purpose of the preliminary hearing. 62 But the opinion which, because of the balance on the court, proved to be decisive was that of the two "swing" judges who voted to deny rehearing en bane on the ground that the witnesses should have v. Anderson, 335 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1964) , in which the preliminary hearing was continued until the proceedings were dismissed as moot following indictment. Judge Bazelon (dissenting from an order of the court denying leave to appeal in forma pauperis from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus) stated that "the question how to vindicate this critical right [to confront witnesses in a preliminary hearing and to refute probable cause] is not frivolous and requires power over the processes of criminal justice." 335 F.2d at 691.
58 185, 203-09 (1965) .
61. 380 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967) . 62. Judge Danaher pointed out that "there is now and ••• for the last few years there has been substantial disagreement among the judges of this court on the matter of 'discovery' in preliminary hearings." 380 F.2d at 566. In a separate opinion, Judge Burger, with whom Judge Tamm joined, said that "[i]t should be clear ••• that a majority of the Court does not agree with the three judges of the sitting division in their effort to re-write the procedure authorized by Congress for a preliminary hearing so as to convert it into a discovery mechanism." 380 F.2d at 569. A fourth judge, without intimating a position on the merits, would have granted rehearing to clarify uncertainties as to the proper function of the preliminary hearing. 380 F.2d at 569. [Vol. 67:1861 been subpoenaed for the purpose of resolving the issue of probable cause. In reaching their conclusion they restated the relationship of discovery to the preliminary hearing:
The focus of the solicitude embodied in the procedural device of the preliminary hearing is the liberty of the accused. Should it be taken away from him because there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime for which the grand jury will indict? To the extent that the prosecution is put to its proof of such probable cause, the accused in effect gets discovery of that much of the Government's case as is comprised of the evidence it adduces to establish probable cause. But that is an inevitable consequence of the hearing, and not its primary purpose. 63 This limitation upon Blue's recognition of discovery as an independently valid purpose of the hearing is particularly significant since it was ·written by the author of the Blue opinion. 64 Decisions in other circuits have not accepted discovery as a purpose of the preliminary hearing. For them, the sole rationale of the preliminary hearing is to inquire whether there is probable cause to hold the defendant pending action by the grand jury. 65 On this premise, the' federal courts generally have not hesitated to rule that the defendant's right to the hearing is mooted when an indictment is returned prior to the date set for a preliminary hearing: since the only purpose of the hearing is to decide whether the defendant should be held for the grand jury, there is no longer any purpose to be served by a hearing after the grand jury has acted. 66 Some courts have also pointed out that the provisions of rule 5 do not apply to a defendant who is arrested under rule 9 following an original indictment, 67 and that there is no rule under which such a defendant may be given a preliminary hearing. 68 Therefore, the courts reason, once the grand jury has acted, a defendant who was arrested either by warrant under rule 4 or without warrant should be in the same 68. 380 F.2d at 563 (statement of Judges McGowan and Leventhal on their reasons for voting to deny rehearing en bane).
64. Judge McGowan, as the author of Blue, was at liberty to comment: "It may well be that there is language in the Blue opinion which obscures this true relation• ship of discovery to probable cause. But, however cloudy or misconceived that language may be, the relationship, as it is given to us to understand it, is as described above." 380 F .2d at 563. position with respect to the hearing as a defendant who was arrested under rule 9.
It is no coincidence that the few courts which hold that a preliminary hearing is not automatically mooted by indictment are those which have recognized the value of the preliminary hearing in affording discovery to the defense. But for some reason the decisions holding that indictment does not moot the hearing have not been premised on a need to afford discovery. In Blue, which shattered precedent by holding that an indictment would not invariably moot the preliminary hearing, 69 the District of Columbia Circuit considered the possible effect of a post-indictment finding of no probable cause:
In a preliminary hearing held or reopened after indictment, the Commissioner would continue under the necessity of making his own independent determination of probable cause. If he were persuaded that no such cause existed, that finding would result in his release of the defendant. It would not affect the indictment, although the Commissioner's action would presumably cause the prosecutor to review the indictment again with care. The defendant could be made to respond to the indictment by summons, or a resumption of custody could be sought by application for a bench warrant. In the latter case, such a singular circumstance as a finding of no probable cause by the Commissioner would presumably be a factor for consideration by the court. 7 0 This explanation, though technically impeccable, reveals the practical anomaly of requiring the commissioner to hold a probable cause hearing after the ultimate decision on probable cause has already been reached by a grand jury. A preliminary hearing after indictment realistically serves a useful function only in terms of discovery. Nevertheless, the "swing" judges in Ross v. Sirica, who 69. The precedent-breaking language stated, inter alia: We do not believe ••• that the mere existence of an indictment renders academic any defects in the Commissioner's proceedings or necessarily insulates those defects from judicial correction.
• • • Where a defendant is denied out of hand the opportunity to consider utilizing that value, we do not think that that denial is to be swept under the rug of a grand jury indictment. Neither do we think that the availability of a remedy should depend upon the outcome of a race between counsel seeking habeas corpus or mandamus and the grand jury acting upon the charge. We, therefore, conclude that relief in such a situation is not to be foreclosed solely by reason of an intervening indictment. !142 F.2d at 899-900. In the case before it, however, the court declined to reverse the conviction on the grounds that the issue had not been timely raised and that the defendant had not been prf judiced: "[W]e cannot find that the Commissioner's failure to accord appellant a meaningful opportunity to elect a preliminary hearing, and thereby to acquaint himself in greater detail with the case against him, so handicapped him in his first trial as to require a second." 342 F.2d at 901. 70. 342 F .2d at 900 n.7. [Vol. 67:1361 sought to minimize the discovery function of the preliminary hearing, indicated their unwillingness to retreat from the position that indictment does not automatically moot the hearing. They castigated the practice, found to exist in another jurisdiction, by which preliminary hearings are avoided through continuances granted routinely until mooted by an indictment. I£ such a practice were attempted in the District, we would find no insuperable barrier in meeting the problem through the sanction of requiring a hearing after indictment. Similarly, we see no jurisdictional barrier to a like sanction for coping with the withholding of critical witnesses whose testimony is the key to the issue of the reasonableness of continued detention. 71 The Supreme Court has been asked to resolve this conflict between Supp. 194, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) , Judge Weinstein noted that "[m]ost courts have felt compelled to deny relief [when the government has delayed the hearing pending indictment] on the ground that the issue of delay was mooted by indictment." In this case, in which the defendants had not yet been indicted, he ordered their release from custody unless a preliminary hearing was held later the same day. Moreover, he noted, "[a]t the insistence of the defendant, the preliminary hearing of a defendant brought before a Commissioner prior to indictment should take place before, or simultaneously with, presentment to the Grand Jury unless, of course, the Grand Jury is operating independently of the United States Attorney-a circumstance most rare. '' 269 F. Supp. at 198. 74. Petition for Certiorari at 2, Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967 132 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968 . In Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 220 (1965) , the Supreme Court had said in dictum:
[W]e think that the Government must proceed through the further steps of the complaint procedure by affording the defendant a preliminary hearing as required by Rule 5, unless before the preliminary hearing is held, the grand jury supersedes the complaint procedure by returning an indictment. In the Sirica case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded:
]aben does not undermine the holding in Blue that an accused who demands the preliminary hearing as is his right is entitled to such a hearing and that, if the point is properly and timely pressed, a denial of that hearing cannot be excused by pointing to an intervening grand jury indictment. Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 1967 ) (footnote, noting that the issue had not been properly raised in the Jaben case, omitted). jury action, the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery undertook a detailed study of the United States Commissioner system. Chaired by Senator Tydings, this subcommittee held extensive hearings over a three-year period, first on the existing law and practices and later on preliminary drafts of the Federal Magistrates Act. 75 The Act was the subject of more thorough, scholarly consideration than most legislation receives. 76 But the adequacy of the congressional appraisal of section 303 in the broader context of federal pretrial criminal procedure is open to question. Our criticism of the congressional decision concerning the preliminary hearing, as embodied in section 303, 77 is twofold: first, it reflects inadequate appreciation of the hearing's potential ability to screen out weak cases, and second, it undermines use of the hearing for discovery while failing to provide any substitute.
A. The Congressional Approach to the Screening Function of the Hearing
Section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act, which provides that a preliminary hearing "shall not be required" after indictment, rests upon a fallacious assumption that a grand jury's consideration of whether or not to return an indictment is equivalent to a preliminary hearing as a screening device. By contrast, the two days of hearings in the House appear to have been conducted almost pro forma. See Hearings on S. 945, H.R.. 5, 502, H.R.. 8, 277, H.R. 8, 520, H.R. 8, 932, H.R.. 9, 970, and H.R.. 10, 841 Before Subcomm. No. 4 This is a hearing which we hope will mark the beginning of an extensive and exhaustive examination of the U.S. commissioner system. We intend to find out all there is to know about the current operation of the commissioner system, and to seek the best available advice from the bench, the bar and the commissioners themselves, of course, the persons who know most about this subject, in order to determine what reforms are needed in this long-neglected "front line" area of Federal justice. Hearings, pt. 1, at I.
77. See note 6 supra.
[ Vol. 67:1861 have his liberty restrained, even to the limited extent of being required to post bail or meet other conditions of release, unless some independent judicial determination has been made that the restraint is justified.'' 78 But the report proceeds on the erroneous premise that "the magistrate, some judicial officer, [ and] the grand jury" are all capable, and equally so, of making an "independent judicial determination" that "restraint is justified. '' 79 The grand jury is not a proper body to reach an "independent judicial determination" of probable cause. Its determination is unlikely to be "judicial" because it is composed of laymen, so whose sole guidance on legal questions will normally come from the prosecutor. Its determination is also unlikely to be "independent" in most cases because, in practice, the prosecutor's influence is usually controlling. In his classic 1932 study of preliminary criminal proceedings in Oregon, Wayne Morse observed that "studies of the grand jury show rather conclusively that it is not inclined to be an independent body but rather that it tends to stamp with approval, and often uncritically, the wishes of the prosecuting attorney. ' Under the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 and for several centuries thereafter the sole function of the accusatory jury in the area of criminal law was to assist the Crown in law enforcement •••• And today, with its power to subpoena witnesses and question them in secret, the grand jury continues to be an important investigative instrument of the prosecutor. 265 F.2d at 461 (citations omitted). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1933): "The inquisitorial power of the grand jury is the most valuable function which it possesses to-day and, far more than any supposed protection which it gives to the accused, justifies its survival as an institution."
In practice, the federal criminal justice system has relied primarily on the discretion of prosecutors, and not on preliminary hearings84 or independent grand jury decisions, to screen out weak cases. The prosecutor does not ordinarily want to take weak cases to trial and will ask leave of court 85 to drop charges when, on reflection, evidence does not appear to warrant prosecution of a person already charged. But prosecutorial "reflection" may take an unreasonably long time. A committing magistrate, formerly an Assistant United States Attorney, noted that the value of the preliminary hearing lies less in the screening given by the hearing itself than in the effect which its pendency has on the prosecutor:
It Moreover, the prosecutor has to take account of factors other than the possibility of winning a particular case. He must also make policy decisions such as whether he will take a hard line on certain types of crime, and it is unrealistic to expect that he can perform this task and still maintain a detached, objective view of the exact strength of each individual case. Indeed, that is not his function. 87 84. In the District of Columbia, most of the screening is undertaken by the prose• cutor prior to the time scheduled for the preliminary hearing. In consequence, very few cases actually result in discharge at the preliminary hearing. After initiating prosecution, the United States Attorney may still exercise his discretion to terminate the case. Unlike his decision not to prosecute, however, these decisions are supervised by the court, since the prosecutor must file a motion to dismiss or request leave to enter a nolle prosequi. As a practical matter, few of these requests are denied.
In fiscal 1965, cases involving 15 percent of the felony defendants were termi• nated prior to trial • • • • Most of these dismissals occur on motion of the U.S. Attorney and are an exercise of his prosecutive discretion.
86. Copy of interview on file at Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C. ·when references are made in the text to interviews commenting on the preliminary hearing in the District of Columbia, and to practices relating to the hearing, supporting data is on file at the Institute of Criminal Law, Georgetown University Law Center, under whose auspices the inter• views were conducted. 87. The difference between a judicial and prosecutorial assessment of the appro-
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There are thus two drawbacks of depending on the prosecutor to screen out cases. First, unless he has to be prepared to make a prompt showing of probable cause he will naturally tend to postpone review. In addition, he does, and should, have a prosecutorial viewpoint. Both of these shortcomings are better remedied by preliminary hearing than by grand jury screening. The fact that the preliminary hearing is both public and adversary makes its screening more independent than the grand jury's.BB It is also more difficult to conceal evidentiary weaknesses at a preliminary hearing. Because the grand jury is composed of laymen, it is incompetent to make legal decisions about whether a prima facie case against the defendant exists. Indeed, since the Supreme Court held in Costello v. United StatesB 0 that a valid indictment may be priateness of felony prosecution may be seen in connection with charges arising out of the April 1968 riots in Washington, D.C., following the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. According to a newspaper account, a veteran district judge, reviewing several hundred indictments in those cases, was of the opinion that the evidence in most of them was too weak for the cases to be tried as felonies. Washington Evening Star, Oct. 10, 1968, at Bl. The article reported that the judge said "that his review of more than 2:70 indictments charging 499 defendants may indicate about 25 'hard core' felonies. [The judge] said there is a number of cases the government cannot prove, and that many others could be reduced to misdemeanors •••• " Yet those cases had been screened by the prosecutor, the preliminary hearing, and the grand jury. For an account of preliminary hearings in the riot cases see Washington Post, April 28, 1968, at DI. The Post reported that at that time about 250 persons had been held for the grand jury after preliminary hearing, that only four defendants had waived the hearing, and that 25 defendants had had charges against them dismissed at preliminary hearing. In addition, the Post reported, "charges have been reduced or dropped in about another 250 cases." Id. Presumably action in these latter cases was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion; see note 84 supra.
88. As Dean A. Kenneth Pye of Duke Law School pointed out in testimony before the Subcommittee, the preliminary hearing is an adversary proceeding. This is why a defendant is given the right to crossexamine, to call witnesses and to testify in his own behalf. He does not have these rights before a grand jury. Indeed, it is a crime for him to communicate with the grand jury without authority. Probable cause has already been determined ex parte by either an officer arresting without a warrant or by a commissioner or judge in issuing a warrant. One reason for the commissioner's hearing is to test the assertion of probable cause by the best truth-seeking device which we have been able to develop-cross-examination by counsel. Hearings, pt. 3, at 270. Professor Samuel Dash of Georgetown University made a similar point:
The bill treats the probable cause screening function of the grand jury on the same qualitative level as the probable cause determination by a judicial officer at a preliminary hearing. It leaves it to the prosecutor to decide which procedure will be made available to an arrested person. Yet can it be seriously argued that probable cause determined by laymen in secret under the guidance of the prosecutor and in the absence of the defendant and his counsel is anywhere near as protective of individual rights as the determination of probable cause by a judicial officer at a public preliminary hearing in the presence of the defendant and his counsel with the right of the defendant to cross-examine and present evidence in his own behalf? 95 But the preliminary hearing's deficiency on this point is potentially remediable, 96 whereas the grand jury's is not.
In concluding that it is unnecessary for a committing magistrate to determine probable cause when the grand jury acts with relative promptness, the draftsmen of the Federal Magistrates Act did not seriously consider the potential usefulness of the preliminary hearing as a screening device. This is clear from the manner in which the Senate Committee report attempts to rebut the "number of witnesses [who] suggested that preliminary examinations should be held in all cases, despite intervening indictments, and that the preliminary examination should to some degree take the place of grand jury proceedings." 97 Instead of addressing itself to the screening rationale underlying this argument, the report erroneously assumes that the sole reason for making the preliminary hearing mandatory would be to provide the defendant with discovery. The immediately succeeding language of the report is confined to a lengthy justification for the Committee's conclusion that "the problem of discovery should be treated separately from that of the preliminary hearing." 98 The Committee's Report contains no discussion of the screening value of the preliminary hearing. 99 99. It is also clear from his testimony before a House subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary that Senator Tydings assumed that those witnesses who had emphasized the importance of the preliminary hearing did so only for the discovery advantages it offered. House Hearings on S. 945, at 74.
MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES
The Staff Memorandum prepared to accompany the draft legislation similarly assumes that the preliminary hearing serves no screening function which cannot be performed better by the grand jury:
Viewed solely as a means of determining probable cause, the preliminary hearing is rendered obsolete by the modem practice-at least in urban areas-of a grand jury sitting continuously, returning indictments soon after an accused is taken into custody or even before he is arrested. It surely seems unnecessary and wasteful to have the question of probable cause determined twice, particularly when the firs&
The Subcommittee heard testimony criticizing the practice of United States Attorneys who moot the defendant's right to a preliminary hearing by racing to the grand jury for an indictment. 100 But some concern was directed not so much to the grand jury indictment mooting the hearing, as to the possibility of excessive delay in obtaining the indictment. 101 The draftsmen were responsive only to the latter criticism. Their purpose was not to insure that all defendants receive a preliminary hearing; instead, it was to insure that they not be held "too long" without either a preliminary hearing or a grand jury indictment. 102 It was this accomplishment of section 303 which President Johnson noted during the bill-signing ceremony.
The influence of Senator Tydings may well have been decisive against ensuring the defendant the right to a preliminary hearing. His personal experience seemed to belie the widely accepted view that the grand jury is an inadequate means of protecting the defendant. In response to a subcommittee witness who was "of the opinion that the grand jury proceedings provide no real safeguard for a person's constitutional and civil rights," Senator Tydings stated: "As one who was charged with a violation of the Corrupt Practices Act and not indicted, I cannot quite agree with you. The grand jury is, probably, a safeguard for the individual, too. I have been on both sides of the fence. That is for the record." 103 It is unfortunate that Senator Tydings sought to generalize from such an atypical incident. When a similar colloquy arose later in the hearings and the Senator again referred to his experience as proof "that the grand juries in this country protect the innocent as well as return determination at the preliminary hearing is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the district court to proceed to the trial of the case. Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 14. Like the Senator, the memorandum proceeds to explain that discovery can best be provided elsewhere. 102. A staff memorandum concluded that the "novel procedure," provided for in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3060(b) (Supp. Feb. 1969 ). This section is quoted in note 6 supra, and seems to serve the primary purpose of a preliminary hearing; namely, to allow an arrested person a prompt determination by an appropriate authority of whether his detention is justified. This seems to be the only conceivable purpose of a preliminary hearing that is not or cannot be served by other procedures in the law. Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 15. 103. Hearings, pt. 1, at 14. The witness, Charles A. Lindquist, was drawing a comparison between grand jury and preliminary hearing, criticizing the ability of the prosecutor to obtain an indictment and thereby moot the hearing, and advocating that "the preliminary hearing [be] made to serve a more useful purpose. " Id. [Vol. 67:1861 charges against the guilty," the witness, Lawrence Speiser of the American Civil Liberties Union, responded: "I might suggest that the grand jury considering the case of a former U.S. attorney or U.S. attorney might be slightly different than when it considers the majority of matters which come before it." 104 It is possible that Senator Tydings' former practice as a United States Attorney was another factor underlying the congressional assumption that the preliminary hearing is unnecessary when the grand jury has acted. In the hearings he made it clear that during his tenure as a prosecutor the preliminary hearing was regularly mooted by indictment, even if the defendant had indicated that he wished to have a hearing. 105 It is ironic that statutory contraction of the committing magistrates' preliminary hearing function comes at a time when the magistrates themselves will be better qualified to perform it, and when substantial new judicial duties are being entrusted to them. 100 104. Hearings on S. 3, 475, at 160. 105 . Hearings, pt. 1, at 37: Senator TYDINGS. Do you feel that in any revision or study that is related to the commissioners that there should definitely be a provision made for preliminary hearings giving a defendant the absolute right of a preliminary hearing?
Mr. MEATYARD. Giving the defendant the right of a preliminary hearing? Yes, I do.
Senator TYDINGS. For instance, do you feel that Tom Kenney's policy as U.S. attorney, which is directly opposite to his predecessor's policy-namely-mine, would be a better policy, that is to say, where a defendant has indicated that he wishes to have a preliminary hearing, he should be permitted to have a pre• liminary hearing prior to any U.S. attorney being able to take the case to the grand jury?
Mr. MEATYARD. I think so, yes. That points up the need that you are going to have to select capable personnel to conduct preliminary hearings. The witness, F. Archie Meatyard, Jr., had served as United States commissioner at Bethesda, Maryland, for approximately nineteen years. Id. at 15.
106. The laudable purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act was "to abolish the office of U.S. commissioner and reform the first echelon of the Federal judiciary into an effective component of a modern scheme of justice by establishing a system of U.S. magistrates." S. REP. No. 371, at 8; H.R. REP. No. 1,629, at 11. The new magistrates are required to be attorneys "unless it is impossible to find a qualified attorney to fill a particular position" and the "anachronistic fee system of compensation" is replaced by "a system of salaries set on a sliding scale according to anticipated workload." Id.
The question of whether magistrates have been adequately upgraded, or whether their judicial functions would more properly be exercised by an article Ill judge, is beyond the scope of this Article. The dissenting views on this point by Mr. Cahill to the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, which approved the bill, raise some serious questions. Representative William T. Cahill argues:
Our Constitution does not refer to, nor provide authority for, a Federal magis• trate system. To the contrary, article Ill specifically provides that Federal judicial power must be vested in "the Supreme Court and such other inferior courts, as the Congress may from time to time establish." Moreover, article II requires that judges of the Supreme Court and "All other officers of the United States whose appointments shall be established by law" must be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Federal judges are also provided lifetime tenure, and protection against diminution of their salaries.
Contrary to these constitutional provisions, magistrates would be appointed by
In the past, the magistrates' lack of judicial qualifications undoubtedly contributed to the assumption that the preliminary hearing and the grand jury proceeding serve much the same purpose; if both procedures may be conducted by laymen and dominated by the prosecutor, there appears little reason to choose between them. Almost one third of the more than 700 current United States Commissioners are not lawyers, 107 and previously only minimal efforts had been made to provide them with "on the job training"-even if such instruction were feasible in such a complex and rapidly changing field. Formal legal assistance was largely limited to that provided in the Manual for United States Commissioners, a wholly inadequate pamphlet distributed by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and not revised since 1948. 108 The opening paragraph of the Manual, after assuring commissioners that they should feel free to confer with the district court judge when necessary, goes on to say:
In any case where the commissioner desires the assistance and advice of the United States attorney or his assistants at any stage of a pro- Section 302 of the Act expands the magistrates' trial jurisdiction to misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than $1,000 or both, subject to the defendant's election to be tried by a magistrate and his right to appeal to the district court. S. REP. No. 371, at 8-9; H.R. REP. No. 1,629, at 11-12. The district courts are empowered to promulgate rules assigning the magistrates "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Section 101 of the Act, amending 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1964) . The subsection continues:
The additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to-(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action, pursuant to the applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district courts;
(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and (3) preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing. [ Vol. 67:1861 ceeding, or in conducting a preliminary examination, he should make a request of the United States attorney therefor .... At times the advice of the United States law enforcement agencies may also be helpful. 109 Excessive reliance on prosecutors and law enforcement agencies was apparent from the responses of some commissioners to a questionnaire sent to them by the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery; 110 in fact, some nonlawyer commissioners cited the ability to turn to the prosecutor for advice as a reason why legal training was unnecessary for committing magistrates. 111 A further reason why legal training for magistrates may have seemed unnecessary under the previous commissioner system was the fact that the defendant usually had no lawyer to raise legal questions. Many federal defendants are indigent,11 2 but neither Congress 113 nor the Supreme Court provided for appointment of counsel prior to the defendant's arraignment upon the indictment 114 until 1964, when 109. MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS 1 (1948) (emphasis added). The final admonition that "the commissioner should always bear in mind that his judicial decisions should be his own, based on the law and the facts in the light of his own best judgment," can hardly undo the damage to that independent judicial spirit which the Manual formally endorses, but has in fact undercut.
110. See note 50 supra; note 111 infra. When the commissioners were asked by the Subcommittee how they were informed of recent decisions affecting their duties, some 114. See note 115 infra. The Attorney General's committee found that "[i]n most federal districts appointed counsel first enters the case when the accused is brought before the court on arraignment and is required to plead to the indictment." AT-the Criminal Justice Act provided for appointment of counsel at the preliminary-hearing stage. 115 Providing counsel tends to increase the frequency of preliminary hearings, since unrepresented defendants often waived preliminary hearings or failed to object when the prosecutor requested a postponement in order to moot the hearing by indictment. The staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery reported:
A number of commissioners expressed concern as to whether defendants without counsel understand the nature and purpose of the preliminary hearing. They indicated that his [sic] failure to understand results in frequent waiver by uncounselled defendants: "It is difficult to explain the significance of the preliminary hearing to many." "Even after thorough explanation some defendants don't seem to understand what a preliminary examination is. [G]uaranteeing counsel at every stage of the proceedings, commencing with the initial appearance before the commissioner, is designed to afford representation to each defendant throughout his involvement in the judicial process. It insures that the advice of counsel will be available at the critical early stages when recollections are fresh and the opportunity to uncover evidence is greatest. H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963) . In 1966, the Supreme Court reflected the change by amending rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to guarantee the defendant's right to the assignment of counsel "at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the commissioner." FED. R. CRIM. P. 44 Prior to its amendment in 1966, the rule had provided: "If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel." The Court also amended rule 5(b) to require that the magistrate inform defendants of this right. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b), Advisory Committee Note to 1966 amendment: "The second change obligates the commissioner to inform the defendant of his right to request the assignment of counsel if he is unable to retain counsel." Prior to the 1966 amendment to Rule 5(b), the commissioner was required to inform the defendant only "of his right to retain counsel."
116. Questionnaire 479. Surprisingly, fifty-five per cent of the commissioners who responded to the questionnaire thought that the frequency of waiver was not significantly affected by whether the accused was represented by counsel. Id. The need for counsel at preliminary hearing is forcefully asserted in 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE 
OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 76 (1965):
Apart from the possibility of a constitutional requirement, it seems clear that counsel should be present at the preliminary hearing, since the defendant without counsel at that stage is at a tactical disadvantage, as pointed out in several of the state reports. First, he does not know whether to ask for the hearing or to waive it. If the hearing is held, he does not know how to cross-examine the state's witnesses, or whether to testify himself. He does not know whether to ask that a record be made of the hearing. He does not know the requisite legal elements of the offense with which he is charged, nor of lesser related offenses, so he is unable to discuss intelligently with the prosecutor possible reduction or dismissal of the charges. Moreover, it is possible, especially if the committing magistrate is untrained in the law, that the defendant will be bound over for the grand jury on insufficient evidence or that political considerations will affect his decision.
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The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 and the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, taken together, offer for the first time in the federal jurisdiction the promise that preliminary hearings will generally have both counsel and a tribunal qualified to perform the hearings' important screening function. Unless this potential is frustrated by section 303 of the Magistrates Act, the preliminary hearing should at last be able to fulfill its potential as a screening mechanism through which felony cases should pass before going on to the grand jury and to trial.
B. Congressional Approach to the Discovery Function of the Hearing
By providing that a preliminary hearing is unnecessary if an indictment is returned within the time limits specified in section 303, the draftsmen of the Magistrates Act made clear their view that discovery was no longer, if it ever had been, an independently valid purpose of the hearing. 117 The subcommittee was not, apparently, unimpressed with the testimony it heard stressing the need for discovery in criminal cases. 118 But it was not convinced that discovery should take place at the preliminary hearing.
In general, the hearing affords the defendant an opportunity to learn the basis of the charges against him, by testimony given under oath and subject to cross-examination, shortly after the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 119 The draftsmen were not unaware of these advantages, but in justifying section 303 they emphasized the lack of uniformity in defendants' ability to obtain a preliminary hearing. The Senate committee report correctly noted that the degree of discovery obtained in a preliminary hearing will vary depending on how much evidence the presiding judicial officer thinks is necessary to establish probable cause in a particular case. This may be quite a bit, or it may be very little, but in either event [D]iscovery in a State like Wisconsin, which has little formal discovery, may in fact be much more complicated than it may appear. Although the preliminary examination was in its inception and certainly in its theory designed to afford a pro• tection against being subjected to a trial when there does not exist probable cause to hold a person for trial, there is no question whatsoever that in practice it is used largely, if not entirely, as a discovery device. As a consequence, at least where the defendant is adequately represented, he is able to learn a great deal about the prosecution's case by demanding a preliminary examination.
it need not be all the evidence ·within the possession of the Government that should be subject to discovery. 120
Moreover, as Senator Tydings pointed out, defendants first arrested after indictment rather than pursuant to rule 4 are ineligible for a preliminary hearing and so cannot use it as a discovery device. 121 This is a negative equal protection rationale which would deny discovery opportunities to some defendants because the law fails to grant them to others.
A second principal reason for the committee's conclusion that the preliminary hearing does not afford "an ideal opportunity for discovery"122 was its belief that the hearing "should be held within a short time after the accused is first arrested. Discovery, on the other hand, can most usefully take place at a later stage, much closer to trial, when the evidence is more nearly complete and defense counsel is better prepared." 123 No doubt discovery closer to trial, after attorneys for both sides have had an opportunity to become familiar with the case, would serve a useful purpose. But the defendant also has a vital interest in obtaining discovery promptly. Because human memory is fallible, evidence which is obtained immediately after the event is more likely to be reliable than evidence which is given later; 124 defense lawyers are well aware of the tactical advantage in- Having concluded that the purpose in seeking to call the witness was to obtain discovery and not to shed light upon the issue of probable cause, the Commissioner was acting within his inherent authority to confine the preliminary hearing to the matters in issue in declining to require that ATU [Alcohol Tax Unit] Agent Sampley submit to examination by the defendant. None of the witnesses who testified before the Subcommittee and no one interviewed in the District of Columbia project (see note 86 supra) favored adoption of the English practice at preliminary hearing. Prior to Parliament's enactment of the Criminal Justice Act of 1967, the English preliminary hearing was a full-scale discovery proceeding at which all witnesses whom the government planned to use at trial had to be called. Williams, Introductory Survey of the Preliminary Examination in England, in Hearings on S. J,475, at 307. The disadvantage lay in the "enormous waste of time by magistrates in having to take down the depositions of prosecution witnesses (by the hand of their clerk)." The Criminal Justice Act of 1967 sought to overcome this problem by providing that the defendant might waive the hearing, and in return for waiver, obtain written depositions of all the witnesses. Id. 121. Hearings on S. J, 475, at 29: " [U]nder current doctrines it will always be possible to bypass the preliminary hearing-and therefore discovery-by proceeding rapidly to indictment after arrest, or by arresting the defendant ohly after an indictment has been returned. '' 122. S. REP. No. 371, [34] [35]  [Vol. 67:1361 herent in preserving witnesses' testimony before it becomes "polished" or influenced by subsequent experiences. 125 Nor does the value of preserving early recollection always lie with the defendant. Testimony favorable to the prosecution may also be "frozen" at the preliminary hearing while witnesses or victims are feeling particularly hostile to the defendant-before affection, remorse, sympathy, or fear may have diluted the quality of their testimony. Moreover, by encouraging the prosecutor to test his case only in the secrecy and security of the grand jury setting, the new legislation reduces the government's chance of learning how well its witnesses will perform in public and under cross-examination.
The draftsmen's position would have been more tenable if their criticism of the adequacy of the preliminary hearing as a discovery device had been accompanied by a substitute proposal for discovery. In an early formulation of the bill, they provided such a substitute by a legislative directive to adopt discovery measures through the rulemaking process. A published staff memorandum, commenting on a preliminary unpublished draft of the Act, states that the bill contains a guiding statement enjoining the rulemakers to take into account not only the benefits to the judicial process of liberal pretrial discovery, but also national security interests and the wellbeing of witnesses in cases where an unfettered discovery procedure might jeopardize either. The rules can therefore provide for appropriate exception to the general right of discovery when the Government can show good cause for making such an exception. 126 Unfortunately, the discovery provision had been dropped by the time that the first printed draft of the legislation appeared. 127 In its stead, the Committee appended a concluding exhortation to its the witness's statement, given in court perhaps months after the event, is the real evidence, while his original proof of evidence, given perhaps within hours of the event, and his deposition at the preliminary hearing, given a few days or weeks after the event, are referred to only for the purpose of contradicting him and not as independent evidence. Chapter 5, Mistaken Evidence, which includes this quotation, is a sobering appraisal of the extent to which reliance should be placed on eyewitness testimony.
125. See note 86 supra. A typical observation of a defense lawyer is, "I think it's important to get [testimony] on the record before it's gotten too polished, as it does by the time it's gone through grand jury and to the stage of trial." Or, "you have a situation [at preliminary hearing] where these people are committed to a position before they haYe had a chance to talk to many friends or neighbors or other witnesses, before they have been influenced, and perhaps improperly. " 126. Staff Memorandum, April 28, 1966, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 16. 127 Vol. 67:1861 formulating rules of procedure and evidence needed to carry out the mandate of section 3060(a): "preliminary examination shall be held ... to determine whether there is probable cause .... "? The latter construction seems more consistent with the rest of new section 3060; it would also leave greater scope for judicial implementation of improvements in preliminary hearing procedures.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Some of the potential drawbacks of the Federal Magistrates Act can be mitigated or overcome through judicial action in formulating case law or rules of procedure. We shall here consider what steps, short of legislative amendment, may be taken to rectify apparent deficiencies in the Act and to take advantage of the opportunities it affords.
A. Prompt Hearing
We have thus far assumed that the prosecutor will be allowed to avoid the preliminary hearing if he is able to obtain an indictment within the time limits specified in the Act. This is a plausible assumption in view of the previous widespread practice in which United States Commissioners, without any express legislative authorization, willingly granted continuances of preliminary hearings so that prosecutors would have enough time to moot the hearing. 131 But betterqualified magistrates will be appointed under the Act, and such solicitude for prosecutorial convenience may be at an end. Other jurisdictions are free to accept the example of the District of Columbia Circuit 132 and refuse to tolerate this practice, for the Act does not in terms give the United States Attorney a free hand to moot the hearing so long as he does so promptly. 133 Section 3060(b) provides for a hearing "within a reasonable time," "but in any event not later than" ten or twenty days after the defendant's initial appearance. "These are outer limits only," the Senate committee report states, "and a court or magistrate may well decide that a reasonable time is well within these limits under the circumstances of a particular case." 134 Such a "particular case" should be interpreted by the courts to include any case in which the defendant demands an immediate hearing, unless the government can show the same "extraordinary circumstances" which would authorize a delay beyond the ten-or twenty-day limit under section 3060(c). This interpretation would not be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act; 135 the evil that section 303 purportedly sought to overcome was the practice of detaining a defendant indefinitely with no probable cause determination by either magistrate or grand jury. 136 Unless the "reasonable time" requirement in section 3060(b) is construed to mean less time than it takes to procure an indictment, the United States Attorneys' offices will be able to revert to the practice of racing to the grand jury in order to moot the defendant's right to a hearing. As noted above, judges on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have said that they would see no objection to requiring a hearing after indictment; 137 but this was prior to passage of the Magistrates Act, and the Act specifically states that "[n]o preliminary examination ... shall be required ... if ... an indictment is returned." 138 This language will undoubtedly make it more difficult for courts to control prosecutors' attempts to circumvent the preliminary hearing, but one option is still available to the federal judiciary: under the Act, the courts retain the power to require that a preliminary hearing be held on demand, without waiting for the time limits given in the Act to expire. Even as prescribing the outside limits of a "reasonable time," the periods specified are too long. There are no circumstances in which a person should be detained unwillingly for as much as ten days before it is competently determined even whether he should be held for trial.
• . . In no circumstances, should the preliminary examination be delayed because the Government is building its case; if the Government lacks probable cause to detain, it should not arrest. Contrary to a suggestion implicit in the Subcommittee's staff memorandum, in no circumstance should timing of the examination be fixed so that an indictment can intervene and avoid the hearing. [Vol. 67:1861 defendant a prompt preliminary hearing would assure continuation of the screening and discovery advantages now available at preliminary hearing. Moreover, holding the hearing promptly after arrest would reduce the incidence of "arrests for investigation." 130
B. Rules of Evidence
After learning of the disparity in commissioners' practices concerning the admissibility of hearsay, Senator Tydings stated that "there should be some statutory guidelines as to evidence which is admissible in hearings for probable cause." 140 But no such guidelines were included in the Act, and it seems likely that the point, which was raised early in the hearings in 1965, had been forgotten when the legislation was finally drafted.
At present, federal preliminary hearings are not generally held pursuant to the usual rules of evidence. 141 Some years ago Chief Justice Warren noted this fact and commented that a proposal before the Judicial Conference to make the usual rules applicable to preliminary hearings provided the defendant waived indictment "would be in accord with the more enlightened procedures developed in some of the states of the Union." 142 139. As Dean A. Kenneth Pye stated in testimony before the Subcommittee: The requirement that the defendant be brought before the commissioner without unnecessary delay and the right of the defendant to have a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause combine to discourage law enforcement officers from arresting on suspicion and then investigating the case at their leisure to determine whether there is probable cause. Hearings, pt. 3, at 270. This advantage of the preliminary hearing was recognized over a hundred years ago in New York, where concern was expressed over the "arrest of a person upon testimony which would be insufficient to hold him, and his detention until evidence can be hunted up, upon which the magistrate might be warranted in committing him." NEW YORK STATE, FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE XXV (1849). The solution proposed was that the preliminary hearing be held as soon as possible, preferably at one sitting. If adjournments were necessary, the hearing was to be continued for only two days at a time, and not more than six days in all, "unless by consent or on motion of the defendant. " Id. at May 20, 1964 May 20, , in 35 F.R.D. 181, 189 (1964 . The Chief Justice added: "These proposals will indeed require a great deal of study, but there can be no doubt that to the extent their objectives can be realized, the process of criminal proceedings will be fairer than it is now or has been in the past." So long as one third of the committing magistrates were not lawyers and most defendants were not represented by counsel at preliminary hearing such a development was not feasible. 143 With the appointment of better-qualified magistrates, the courts or the rulemaking bodies will be able to require that the hearing be conducted according to the usual rules of evidence. 144 There is, however, no valid reason for conditioning the application of evidentiary rules upon the defendant's waiver of his constitutional right to indictment. Such a condition is also open to serious constitutional doubt. 145 There is a tendency to assume that the principal reason for objecting to hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing is a desire to obtain discovery; if hearsay cannot be used to establish probable cause, then the prosecution will be forced to resort to more revealing direct testimony, and thus to provide the defense with an opportunity for cross-examination. It is true that eyewitness testimony given at the hearing is a valuable kind of discovery; but eyewitness testimony also is obviously more reliable than hearsay for the purpose of determining probable cause. 146 In our view, it is time to adopt the reform discussed by Chief Justice Warren and to require that preliminary hearings be conducted "under the usual rules of evidence," except to the extent that these rules are waived by consent of the parties.
In the interest of time, counsel on occasion would presumably be willing to have some elements of the alleged offense, such as chemical analysis of substances thought to contain narcotics, established by hearsay. Moreover, when an immediate hearing is sought, necessary evidence may not yet be available. A number of commissioners told the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery that the need for more time to make further investigations and to obtain additional evidence is among the reasons which the government asserts for seeking a continuance in the preliminary hearing. 147 To alleviate this problem, the government could be allowed to make a proffer of evidence which, for adequate reasons, was not available at the time of the hearing-for example, because it consisted of documentary proof being sent from elsewhere. If the proffered evidence plus the available evidence does not establish probable cause, the defendant should be discharged. Otherwise, the defendant might agree either to have the proffer treated as evidence or to obtain an adjournment of the hearing until the witness could be produced. This procedure would both protect the defendant from an illegal arrest for investigation and insure that the government would not have to release a defendant when probable cause against him cannot be established immediately because essential evidence has not yet been received.
Application of the hearsay rule and the other usual rules of evidence to the preliminary hearing is relatively simple. But the question of excluding evidence on constitutional grounds raises more complex problems. On the one hand, it makes little sense for a qualified magistrate to conduct an adversary, judicial hearing and then to hold the defendant when the only evidence against him has obviously been obtained by unconstitutional means. On the other hand, rule 4l(e) provides that motions for the suppression of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure 148 are to be made A number of courts have felt that if a motion to suppress is available before trial when evidence has allegedly been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-in district court; and, since suppression may turn upon complex constitutional issues, there are grounds for not allowing committing magistrates to make a final ruling. 149 Unless hearings are mooted, resolution of this dilemma will become increasingly urgent as better qualified defense counsel and magistrates are involved in the hearings. A solution would be to permit the committing magistrate to determine constitutional evidentiary issues only for purposes of ruling upon the admissibility of evidence offered before him on the issue of probable cause, leaving the defendant to his rule 4l(e) remedy if he is held to answer.um But the government should be allowed to petition the district court to set aside a discharge order based upon exclusion of evidence alleged to be unlawfully obtained.
C. Result of Magistrate's Finding of No Probable Cause
The Magistrates Act does not change the existing law under which the prosecutor may present a case to the grand jury even though the committing magistrate has found no probable cause at the preliminary hearing. 151 In order to make preliminary hearing a meaningful screening device, a rule should be adopted providing that the prosecutor, as an officer of the court, may not present evidence to a grand jury in a case in which the magistrate has found no probable cause at the hearing. An exception to this rule should be provided ment, there should be a similar procedure available when it is claimed that evidence has been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly they have held that a motion will lie when it is claimed that a confession was illegally obtained. Up until now, I have allowed defense counsel to cross-examine on these matters, but one of the enforcement agencies has seen fit to complain to the Court, and I have been advised by the Court that I have no right to rule on these questions since they must be decided by the Judges of the District Court under Rule 41. This, in my opinion, results in a great injustice, especially where it is clear from tl1e evidence before me that the warrant was illegally issued and/or that the defendant was illegally arrested, and hence all the evidence following the arrest is inadmissible, especially where admissions or confessions were obtained without affording the defendant an opportunity to consult counsel.
Why should a defendant have to seek bail, be indicted, and probably be committed and wait months for a motion to be filed in Court after the indictment, or at trial, in cases like this? Questionnaire 492.
150. Implementation of this proposal might require a revision of rule 4l(e); see 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 148, at 105: "[U]nder the rule [41(e)] the motion must be made before the court while before adoption of the rule it could be made to a United States commissioner." See also Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) .
151. Some commissioners responding to the questionnaire expressed dissatisfaction with the practice. Questionnaire 491. [Vol. 67: 1361 for instances in which the prosecutor obtains leave of court to seek an indictment upon a showing that the magistrate erred. 152 Once the government has chosen to follow the path of pre-indictment arrest and preliminary hearing, the prosecutor should not be permitted to make a mockery of that proceeding by seeking an indictment from the grand jury in disregard of the magistrate's ruling. 153 
D. Depositions for Discovery
The foregoing proposals would all retain or increase the amount of discovery now effectively available at the preliminary hearing. But even if all of them were adopted, discovery at preliminary hearings would, as the legislators pointed out, 154 be haphazard. On the other hand, if discovery at the preliminary hearing is reduced, either because hearings are consistently mooted or because magistrates terminate the proceedings as soon as probable cause is established, then a uniquely valuable discovery tool will have been lost. In either event, it is time that testimonial discovery in criminal cases was extended on a more rational basis. Liberalization of the rules governing the availability of grand jury minutes, Jencks Act 155 state- [I]n Wisconsin there is a right to a preliminary examination which cannot be denied the defendant by resort to the grand jury. As a consequence, any defendant who requests a preliminary examination can get one. It is typically true that the prosecution is required to put in much, if not all, of its case in order to insure a finding of probable cause to hold a defendant for trial ••.. If the defendant has waived a preliminary examination, appears for arraignment and requests assigned counsel, a statute in ·w·isconsin provides that he has a right to have the case remanded for a preliminary examination. 153. In light of skepticism concerning the adequacy of the grand jury's screening of probable cause, it may also be time to review the extent to which the prosecutor should have discretion to seek an original indictment without the prior issuance of a complaint, upon which a rule 5(c) hearing would be held to determine probable cause. In the District of Columbia, defendants are sometimes arrested on one charge, as to which probable cause is found at preliminary hearing, and subsequently indicted on others, the events in which may have occurred earlier. See Godfrey v. United States, 353 F.2d 456, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; Hearings, pt. 3, at 279 (remarks of Dean A. Kenneth Pye of Duke Law School); note 86 supra. Rather than allow the prosecutor to exercise unfettered discretion as to whether to proceed by rule 5 or rule 9, it would be preferable to delineate the kinds of cases as to which an original indictment is particularly appropriate (for example, income tax, antitrust and regulatory crimes, when the defendant will often know the evidentiary basis for the indictment because it comes largely from his own records). Alternatively, the prosecutor might be required to obtain special leave of the district court, explaining the need for obtaining an original indictment in an individual case.
154. See notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text. 155. For a discussion of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), and its application ments, and other ·written material will not provide an effective substitute for preliminary hearing discovery. All of them lack the advantage of direct confrontation and of having witnesses under oath and subject to cross-examination. 156 In our view, only the adoption of deposition procedures, analogous to those that have long been available in federal civil proceedings, 157 would afford adequate and consistent discovery in criminal cases. The proposal for allowing depositions in criminal cases is by no means new, 158 but it seems to be gaining somewhat broader acceptance at present. At least limited support was recently provided by a Task Force of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:
It is undesirable to confine the use of depositions only to the preservation of testimony of witnesses who may be unavailable at trial. Depositions may be used to find facts as well as to preserve testimony. A deposition could resolve a factual dispute during the negotiating stage, and it could provide the basis for a stipulation of witnesses' testimony at trial. In cases where it is not necessary to conduct a full preliminary hearing before a judge, depositions may be submitted to the court for determination of probable cause. 159 Although only a handful of states have provisions permitting the use of depositions in criminal cases, 160 their use is becoming less uncommon.101
The Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery was in a unique position to explore the potentialities of the deposition and other discovery mechanisms with the numerous expert witnesses who testified before it, 162 but it failed to take advanto a specific discovery problem, see Recent Development, Criminal Procedure-Evidence -Composite Drawing Not Producible Under Jencks Act, 66 MICH. L. REv. 772 (1968). tage of this opportunity. There are many features requiring careful consideration. For example, to what extent could discovery be made reciprocal, within constitutional bounds? 163 Would it be adequate to allow depositions to be taken before any person qualified to administer oaths, or is there sufficient difference from civil cases to require that criminal discovery take place before a judicial officer with some authority to protect witnesses? It may well be that judicial control of depositions is needed, since there is a real possibility that a witness called to testify at the deposition might incriminate himself. Rather than entrust this responsibility to one of the two counsel present, neither of whose interests may coincide with the witness', it might be preferable to require the presence of a judicial officer possessing the authority to appoint counsel for a witness who needs it. Similarly, there may be stronger reasons to object to the form or content of questions in depositions in criminal cases than in civil. Once again, having a judicial officer available to make a ruling on the spot would serve a useful purpose. In fact, the newly created federal magistrates might themselves be given such a task. Section 101 of the Federal Magistrates Act provides that the district court may establish rules pursuant to which ... any full-time United States magistrate, or . . . any part-time magistrate specially designated by the court, may be assigned ... additional duties .... The additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to-(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions .... 164 In short, the Federal Magistrates Act can serve to further rather than to retard criminal discovery. The Supreme Court, through its rule-making authority, or the district courts through theirs, 165 should act to fill the potential void in discovery arising out of the Act's preliminary hearing provisions, and advantage should be taken of the express availability of the federal magistrates whom the Act provides to conduct pretrial discovery proceedings.
